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J (A Child) (Reporting Restriction: Internet: Video), Re [2013] EWHC 2694 (Fam); [2014] E.M.L.R. 7
(Fam Div)
*J. Crim. L. 202 The father in this case had four children: L, C, W and J. L, C and W had previously
been taken in to care by Staffordshire County Council under child protection orders and placed with
new families. This case involved the parents' fourth child, J, who was born in April 2013 at home
against medical advice.
The father of J had a history of posting information regarding his other children on social media sites.
In February 2012 he posted images of L and C on Facebook with comments valuing both children as
being worth £200,000 each to Social Services. In April 2012 the father posted an image of W with the
comment ‘snatched from the delivery suite by Staffordshire County Council’. The father also posted
an image of the social worker describing her as a vampire-ish creature lurking in the corner, about to
steal the child from the loving parents and that she was ‘a wicked, wicked woman’ who ‘will suffer for
this’.
On the day of J's birth, the father posted comments on Facebook stating ‘SS banging on the door
we're not answering’ and ‘SS gone to get EPO’. The father then secretly filmed social services
removing the baby from the parents' care, and the video was broadcasted online by UK Column Live
on 5 April 2013. UK Column Live also posted the video on YouTube. The video was subsequently
shown on numerous other websites. On 12 April 2013, UK Column Live broadcasted an interview with
J's father in which both parents, W and J were all identified by name. This video was subsequently
withdrawn at the father's request.
Staffordshire County Council sought a contra mundum injunction to prevent the publication of any
material which could disclose J's identity, including images or any information relating to: the newly
born child, the parents, the carers, the county council and any other employees involved in the child
protection process. Under s. 97(2) of the Children Act 1989, it is a criminal offence for a person to
publish to the public any material which is intended, or likely, to identify a child involved in
proceedings under either the Act or under the Adoption and Children Act 2002, or to publish the
details of the child's address or the address of the child's school. It is a defence if the accused can
show he did not know, and had no reason to suspect, that the published material would be likely to
identify the child. Under s. 97(4), the court possesses the power to dispense with the requirements of
s. 97(2) if the child's welfare requires it. A breach of s. 97 is triable summarily and punishable by a
fine not exceeding level 4. Breach of a contra mundum order is punishable as a contempt of court.
HELD, GRANTING THE APPLICATION, a contra mundum injunction was justified, but in an
amended form. The order should allow the publication *J. Crim. L. 203 of images of the child and
information relating to all involved in the emergency protection process, including the carers and
council workers. The names and addresses of the child and parents must not be published.
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COMMENTARY
An 18-year contra mundum order was already put in place in relation to child W by Hedley J on 14
June 2012. After posting images of W and the social workers on Facebook and referring to W by
name during an online interview, the father admitted breaching this order. He was given concurrent
six-week sentences for each breach, which were suspended on condition that he complied with the
various orders and obligations imposed. Further violations in relation to J would have brought about
further criminal sanctions under s. 97 of the Children Act 1989 as well as the risk of the suspended
sentences being triggered.
In reaching his decision, Sir James Munby, President of the Family Division, placed substantial
emphasis on the need for the family courts to be opened up to the public and to display more
transparency in the child protection process. Transparency within the family courts has been a key
item on Munby LJ's agenda. In his initial View from the President's Chambers [2013] Fam Law 548,
his Lordship stated:
I am determined to take steps to improve access to and reporting of family proceedings. I am
determined that the new Family Court should not be saddled, as the family courts are at present, with
the charge that we are a system of secret and unaccountable justice.
This was followed by draft practice guidance indicating that the court must ordinarily publish judicial
decisions unless there is a compelling reason not to do so in relation to cases brought by local
authorities under the Children Act 1989 or the Adoption and Children Act 2002. A court may publish
any other judgment where a party or an accredited member of the media applies for an order
permitting publication, and the judge concludes that the judgment may be published taking account of
the rights arising under any relevant provision of the European Convention on Human Rights,
including Articles 6 (right to a fair hearing), 8 (respect for private and family life) and 10 (freedom of
expression). A judgment should in any event be published whenever the court considers that
publication is in the public interest, whether or not a request is made by a party or the media.
In Re J (A Child), Munby LJ placed emphasis on the severity of family orders:
I have said this many times in the past but it must never be forgotten that, with the state's
abandonment of the right to impose capital sentences, orders of the kind which family judges are
typically invited to make in public law proceedings are amongst the most drastic that any judge in any
jurisdiction is ever empowered to make. When a family judge makes a placement order or an
adoption order in relation to a twenty-year old mother's baby, the mother will have to live with the
consequences of that decision for what may be upwards of 60 or even 70 years, and the baby for
what may be upwards of 80 or even 90 years. We must be vigilant to guard against the risks. (at [28])
His Lordship emphasised the ‘right of the public to know, the need for the public to be confronted with,
what is being done in its name’ in order to *J. Crim. L. 204 provide ‘public scrutiny and public
accountability’. His Lordship referred to the statement made by Lord Steyn in R v Secretary of State
for the Home Department, ex p. Simms [2000] 2 AC 115 that ‘freedom of speech is the lifeblood of
democracy. The free flow of information and ideas informs political debate … it facilitates the
exposure of errors in the … administration of justice of the country’ (Simms at 126)
Munby LJ also referred to his previous comments in A v Ward [2010] EWHC 16 (Fam):
… the law has to have regard to current realities and one of those realities, unhappily, is a decreasing
confidence in some quarters in the family justice system--something which although it is often linked
to strident complaints about so-called ‘secret justice’ is too much of the time based upon ignorance,
misunderstanding, misrepresentation or worse. (at [133])
In the present case it was argued that J's anonymity should be further protected by virtue of a contra
mundum order as the publications made by the father were not only a breach of the child's right to
privacy under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, but could also put the child at a
risk of harm both in the present and future.
It was Mr Alistair MacDonald QC's submission, on behalf of the County Council, that the published
material would be potentially embarrassing to the child and the material could be used in future for
bullying campaigns which could create an adverse effect on J, both emotionally and in regards to J's
future development. In addition, by allowing material to be published, there was an intrusion into J's
privacy contrary to Article 8 whereby J's life story will be played out within the ‘uncontrolled
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insensitivities’ of the internet (at [76]).
Munby LJ acknowledged the validity of arguments in favour of J's Article 8 rights. However, his
Lordship suggested that he would not be prepared to grant an injunction based on ‘the manner or
style in which the material is being presented on the internet, nor to spare the blushes of those being
attacked, however abusive and unjustified those attacks may be’ (at [80]). His Lordship further
identified that it was not part of the Family Division's jurisdiction to prevent the dissemination of
material on the grounds of it being defamatory or in violation of criminal law:
If what is published is defamatory, the remedy is an action for defamation, not an application in the
Family Division for an injunction. If a criminal offence has been committed, the appropriate course is
the commencement of criminal proceedings. If it is suggested that publication should be restrained as
involving a criminal offence, that is a matter for the Law Officers. (at [39])
Munby LJ highlighted a difference between restricting the publication of a one-day-old baby's name
and restraining the publication of his or her image. He suggested that ‘although anyone can identify a
baby by its name it is almost impossible, unless you are the parent, to distinguish between
photographs of children of that age who have the same general appearance’ (at [81]). He suggested
that without knowledge of the child's name, an internet search would be rendered impossible. His
Lordship argued that the public interest in the publication of material which would allow scrutiny and
awareness of the workings of the care system outweighed the *J. Crim. L. 205 interest in restricting
the publication of the child's image, and an injunction preventing the images being published would be
disproportionate. He suggested that the restriction on publishing the child's name was sufficient and
‘public debate is enabled to continue with the public having access to the footage albeit not knowing
who the anonymous child is whose image is on view’ (at [82])
Although Munby LJ may be commended for attempting to open up the family courts in order to
increase public confidence in them--contrary to the fact that the decision was celebrated as a
landmark case in some quarters of the media (see, for example, Steve Doughty, ‘Top judge's war on
secret courts: family hearings must be exposed to glare of publicity’, Daily Mail, 5 September
2013)--this decision gives rise to some concerns. Munby LJ's suggestion that the child is
unrecognisable at such an early age and that most one-day-old babies are indistinguishable from one
another may well be valid. However, it is likely that children will recognise themselves at a later date
as the subject of a video depicting their removal from the care of their parents. On viewing this
footage, a child may well find this embarrassing, disturbing or harmful. The argument that others will
not be able to recognise the child, thereby removing the risk of the footage being used for the purpose
of bullying, still does not remove the issue that exposure to the footage, regardless of the source,
would create a risk of harming the child. It is submitted that the child does have Article 8 rights not to
have such an important event in his or her life at such a young age broadcast across the internet
without his or her consent. Perhaps the decision to allow images to be published in the public interest
of creating transparency is a disproportionate interference with the rights of the child.
The decision also raises questions regarding at what age a child is deemed to be distinguishable from
his or her peers and, therefore, entitled to have the publication of his or her image restricted. The
answer will most likely be that this must be decided on a case-by-case basis. However, this is not
helpful for those who publish an image believing the child to be too young to be identified, only to
discover at a later date that they have inadvertently fallen foul of the law in the event that a judge
disagrees and deems the image to be likely to identify the child. The lack of clarity created is of
concern and the decision in Re J should be regarded with caution.
Secondly, there is a question over the protection of those who work within social services. Social
workers have a difficult role when intervening in child protection cases, and the removal of a child can
be a stressful and confrontational experience. The nature of the social worker's role means that such
workers are not always popular in the eyes of sections of the public. The popularity of social
networking sites provides a platform for those who wish to expose social workers and to coordinate
hate campaigns. Hate sites such as UK Social Workers Exposed have allowed users to post names,
images and addresses of social workers and depicted social workers as Nazis. Munby LJ's decision
to allow the images of social workers to be posted exposes those working in the child protection
system to greater risks of being identified as they carry out their duties. The Protection from
Harassment Act 1997 and the Malicious Communications Act 1988 may *J. Crim. L. 206 offer some
protection to social workers in more extreme cases, but the decision in the present case limits what
little protection social workers currently have in place. Furthermore, it is submitted that criminal
proceedings under the two Acts could potentially increase as a consequence of this decision as those
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harmed by invasive or abusive behaviour online must rely on the reactionary criminal law response,
rather than the more preferred proactive protection afforded by a contra mundum order. Users of
social media sites are now free to post images of social workers carrying out their duties and they are
free to name those within the images. It has been argued by the British Association for Social
Workers that social workers require greater protection when carrying out their duties and that Munby
LJ's decision is a backward step (see Nushra Mansuri, ‘Social workers may be targeted online
following Munby video footage ruling’, Guardian Professional, 24 September 2013).
Munby LJ is clearly following an agenda to open up the family courts in response to criticisms that the
Family Court is a ‘secret court’, using his position as the President of the Family Division of the Court
of Appeal to shape the law in this area. The concern is that in following this approach his Lordship
has given insufficient weight to the rights of the child and the professionals involved in the process
while also creating unnecessary uncertainty within the law. It is disturbing that a process which has
the protection of children as its overarching principle quickly trivialises the rights of the child in favour
of the rights of the parents and the media in the name of transparency.
Zach Leggett
J. Crim. L. 2014, 78(3), 202-206
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